Although there are several good studies on the causes and/or implications of presidential crises and interruptions of mandates in Latin America (HOCHSTETLER, 2007; LLANOS and INÁCIO, 2015; MARSTEINTREDET, 2008; PÉREZ-LIÑÁN, 2007 , 2014 VALENZUELA, 2004) , there remains a lack of studies that address the regional repercussions of presidential crises in South America. The present study seeks to fill this Occurring just a week before the initiation of the impeachment process, this last incident was the trigger for the crisis that led to the President's fall. In terms of evidence against the President, the legal case limited itself to stating that all the facts were simply of 'public notoriety', which therefore did not need to be proved by a parliamentary investigation. However, the events mentioned in the indictment must be understood as Table 01 presents a comparison of Paraguayan presidents since the end of the Stroessner dictatorship. As can be observed, among the directly elected presidents, the only one who managed to finish his constitutionally mandated term without an attempted coup was Nicanor Duarte. As for the other elected presidents, they have either had their mandates interrupted or had to deal with successive institutional crises.
Analysis of the removal of Fernando Lugo in Paraguay supports the arguments of Marsteintredet (2008) , who states that: "Presidential regimes are changing their modus operandi by introducing a greater number of more flexible, and in some cases also quasiparliamentary, solutions to political crises, as well as new ways of making presidents politically accountable (MARSTEINTREDET, 2008, pp. 47-48 ; translation by the authors).
We must note, however, that presidential instability in Paraguay is the norm and that the fall of President Lugo continues a common pattern during the almost three decades of presidential elections in Paraguay.
The immediate reactions of the governments of South America
The presidents of all the countries of South America condemned President This meant the minimum quorum for opening Parlasur's first session of the year was not obtained (AGÊNCIA CÂMARA, 2012), because it is necessary that at least one representative from each of member country to be present for any session to be opened.
Based on the positions adopted by members of the Mercosur Parliament, summarized in Table 02 , some important considerations can be made regarding the frustrated attempt to debate the issue. With the presence of a majority of federal deputies, the Brazilian representatives in Parlasur agreed, by majority vote, that Brazil would oppose the definitive exclusion of Paraguay. The majority position was that Parlasur is independent of the governments that form the bloc and therefore does not have to follow the decisions of the executives. On the other hand, it was also significant that Paraguay is the only member to have elected its members of parliament in Mercosur by direct vote, unlike the other three countries, which select their representatives among members of the national parliaments (AGÊNCIA SENADO, 2012, p. 01; translation by the authors).
As for the question of the suspension itself, it is possible to identify political On the one hand, the new system preserved the provision of an arbitration procedure via the constitution of ad hoc Arbitration Tribunals, while on the other hand it introduced the previously unavailable option of bringing an appeal to a permanent court, the TPR. This body was created to produce consistent and systematic jurisprudence within the bloc, and was instituted only on August 13, 2004 in Asunción.
Although constituted as a court for reviewing the outcomes of arbitration processes, the TPR can also act in the first instance. In legal terms, it also acts as an 'a quo' court and not only as a court of appeal, or 'ad quem' judgment.
The jurisdiction of the TPR is consultative, meaning that it is not mandatory for the national authorities to follow the judgments it issues, which only constitute lines of interpretation. As regards the rules by which requests for advisory judgments are referred to the TPR, the Protocol respected the intergovernmental nature of the bloc and left this to the discretion of national judiciaries 7 . Unlike the legal structure developed in the European Union, the creation of the TPR did not produce autonomous, supranational institutions in Mercosur's dispute settlement system. In their response to Paraguay's request, the governments of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay presented their defense in a joint petition, probably as a way of challenging the impression that the Uruguayan government had been forced to approve the suspension. In their defense of the decision taken by the presidents, three preliminary points were raised: firstly, they alleged that the Court did not have the competence to rule on the case on the grounds of subject-matter jurisdiction ('ratione materiae'), taking _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ into account the political nature of the decision to suspend Paraguay and the commercial nature of the Mercosur dispute settlement system; secondly, they alleged that the procedure for exceptional and urgent cases provided for in Article 24 of the Olivos Protocol that had been chosen by the applicant, did not apply to the case; and finally, the three countries claimed that the Court lacked the necessary jurisdiction of an 'originating body' ('instancia originaria'), due to its being a Permanent Review Tribunal.
On the merits of the case, the joint petition defended the legality of both the suspension of Paraguay and the accession of Venezuela. Regarding the Paraguayan suspension, the following points were emphasized: the importance of the democratic clause, provided for in the Ushuaia Protocol, and its link to the continuation of the integration process; the claim that previous consultations with various Paraguayan political actors had been held; the rights of the Heads of State to suspend Paraguay, as well as the proportionality of the measure, being of a strictly political and provisional nature; and finally, the defendants maintained that the removal of President Lugo, carried out by means of a summary procedure, had produced an effective rupture of the democratic order in Paraguay. Regarding the legality of the declaration of incorporation of Venezuela into Mercosur, the joint petition argued for a distinction between two acts: on the one hand, the approval of the application for membership, which would require unanimity and which already had the support of Paraguay; and, on the other hand, the declaration of admission of a new member, which would not require such unanimity.
The TPR decision can be summarized through the analysis it offered on the three preliminary issues raised by the joint defense, that is the claim that the case lay outside the TPR's jurisdiction, being a political rather than commercial matter; of the impermissibility of the procedure chosen by Paraguay, reserved for exceptional and urgent matters; and of the TPR's lack of authority for not being an 'a quo' court. As regards the first preliminary question, perhaps the most important of the three since the Tribunal's position on the matter was not yet known, it was decided unanimously that its jurisdiction extended to examining the legality of the application of the Ushuaia Protocol. It was therefore considered competent to hear the matter submitted to it by Paraguay. On the second preliminary question on exceptional cases of urgency, the TPR accepted it unanimously, deciding that the conditions for the admissibility of the corresponding procedure, which was governed by Decision 23/2004, were not present.
Finally, with regard to the third preliminary issue on direct access to the Tribunal, it was decided by majority vote that the TPR could not intervene directly in the case without the express consent of the other state parties. Therefore, having accepted two of the three procedural issues raised by the joint petition, the arbitrators unanimously decided to reach a decision without entering into the merits of the case.
Final considerations
The overview we have provided of Paraguay's democratic experience and our 
